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THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND
CULTURE. By Lawrence M. Friedman. Cambridge,
MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1990. Pp. 206.
$27.50
Reviewed by Burton M. Leiser*
In the final chapter of The Republic of Choice, which he
dubs "A Stab at Assessment," Lawrence Friedman says that his
book "has been pitched mostly at the level of description and
explanation."1 This is the opportunity Friedman gives himself
and his readers to examine some of the normative issues
raised by the observations he has made in the preceding nine
chapters about Western society in general and American
society and legal institutions in particular. Those normative
questions are not insubstantial. Nor has Friedman successfully
relegated all normative judgments to the final chapter and
rendered a pure description in the earlier parts of the book.
Even anthropologists describing foreign cultures, religious
practices, and legal or quasi-legal institutions may be unable
to do so with perfect objectivity and without some admixture
of praise or blame. It is far less likely that an American law
professor would be able to describe his own legal and social
milieu dispassionately, without some measure of normative
judgment.
The book opens with a scene from the winter of 1985,
when the temperafure dropped below freezing and New York
City officials issued an order to pick up the homeless, the
drifters, and the derelicts, and to use force if necessary to
remove them to municipal shelters.' Some of those who were
picked up objected, insisting that they were entitled to their
* Burton M. Leiser, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor of
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1. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHoRrrY, AND CULTURE 188 (1990)
[hereinafter CHOICE].
2. Id. at 1.
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"freedom" and that their rights were being violated? It ends
two hundred pages later with a discussion of the situation in
which the homeless, the dispossessed, the Joyce Browns,4 and
the mentally ill find themselves, and the rights they claim to
possess. Between these rather bleak descriptions of the
homeless and their plight, we are treated to a fascinating array
of observations on American life in the last decades of the
twentieth century and the social, political, philosophical, and
legal trends that have led to the conditions that Friedman
describes. Friedman is an astute observer and he brings a
wealth of solid historical scholarship to bear upon his subject.
In early societies, he notes, theories of law emphasized
the sacral, magic, and "meta-human."' Laws derived from God
and were the special province of charismatic personalities.
They were immutable and timeless, in no way related to the
whims of human beings or dependent upon their consent, but
legitimate because of their divine origin.7 Modern society's
chief distinction from those of ancient times is its emphasis on
individualism and the choices that are available to individuals:
[Modern society] structures relationships
contractually, rather than through time-honored
customs and mores; it does not force people into
fixed social roles, decreed by sacred tradition
and inexorable at the moment of birth, or at set
stages of life; it turns its back on inheritance and
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. Joyce Brown, a homeless woman. who had assumed the name "Billie Boggs," was
forcibly hospitalized during a period of extremely cold weather and eventually released under
court order. It was alleged that she had become a public nuisance, urinated and defecated
in the street, screamed obscenitites at passers-by, and was incapable of caring for herself. She
was eventually released under court order and became something of a celebrity, appearing on
television talk shows and at various university campuses. See Matter of Boggs, 136 Misc.2d
1082, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1987), resd sub nom. Boggs v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 132
A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987).
5. CHOICE, supra note 1, at 188-90.
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 22-23.
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ascription, and opens the door to freedom,
mobility and choice.'
This is the theme of the book, summed up in a single
crucial sentence: "[T]he history of humanity is a history that
moves, or ought to move, from choicelessness to choice."9
The evolution of American society in that direction has gone
so far, according to Friedman, that the founders of American
democracy themselves would not only not recognize late
twentieth-century America; they would be horrified by it. 0
The concept of freedom that prevailed throughout the
nineteenth century was confined principally to the political and
economic spheres and had relatively little to do with the kind
of personal autonomy, such as the choice of "life style," that
has come to characterize American society in the latter part
of the twentieth century." "Freedom" and "individualism" in
the nineteenth century meant popular government, throwing
off the paternalistic governments of the past, asserting the
right of individuals of all walks of life to participate in the
nation's governance, and acting on the belief that the people
would have enough self-discipline, responsibility, and maturity
to make wise choices for themselves. But no one seriously
questioned the traditional personal values of moderation and
self-control, respectable behavior and adherence to time-
honored norms of conduct. Middle class morality would
naturally prevail, people would work hard, and they and the
general economy would prosper accordingly.
In such a society, "people did not choose a particular
way of life; rather, they were trained to accept a preformed
preexisting model."'" "The coercive parts of the law - criminal
rules, primarily - were irrelevant to such people as coercion,
8. Id. at 23.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Id. at 26.
11. Id. at 27-28.
12. Id at 33.
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but they were important in other ways. They protected the
interests of the respectable majority from the weaknesses and
crimes of people whose control systems were weak, defective,
or altogether lacking.' 13
The law was designed to control "tramps, thieves,
paupers, [and] moral delinquents."'4  Deviance was not
tolerated, and the law was designed, at least in part, to
proclaim the virtue of moderation and self-control and to
condemn such vices as drunkenness, gambling, and
debauchery. 5 Discipline was one of the greatest virtues, both
because it reflected personal morality and because it was
necessary in a society that was becoming increasingly
dependent upon teamwork in large, dangerous places like
factories and railroads. 6 Jefferson and Locke, Friedman says,
would be amazed at the modern "right of privacy," for it is as
remote as anything could have been from their own concepts
of basic rights and liberties. 7 But this notion, that people
should fashion their own destinies through decisions they make
throughout their lives, 8 permeates modern society as a kind
of controlling idea entitled, somehow, to govern both personal
conduct and the legal system. People generally believe that
their actions are voluntary, that even their habits and tastes
are the result of choices they have made. With the exception
of certain circles in the intellectual world, they reject the
notion that criminal or deviant behavior can rationally be
excused by theories of determinism. But according to
13. id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 34.
16. Id. (citing Lane, Urbanization and Criminal Violence in the 19th Century: Massachusetts
as a Test Case, in THE HISTORY OF VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 468, 477 (H.D. Graham & Ted
R. Gurr eds. 1969)). See also JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS 149
(1981), commenting on the necessity of maintaining factory discipline and the strong norms
against drinking and drunkenness: "Frugality, punctual appearance, scheduled activities are
all part of an institutional structure in which loose, erratic, and spontaneous behavior threaten
the coordination of parts and whole." CHOICE, supra note 1, at 218 n.25.
17. CHOICE, supra note 1, at 40.




Friedman, there remains a kind of ambivalence, even in
popular culture: "Some people like freedom but also want to
be led; others want freedom of choice but believe in the old
values; they like strict order, they like authority. They support
compulsion, discipline, firmness in government, and strict
morality in private life.19
Friedman suggests that this ambivalence is not
necessarily contradictory or incompatible with the "republic of
choice," because "[d]emocracy and freedom of choice
themselves require a certain level of toughness, a certain
solidity of structure."'  Genuine liberty, in other words, is
impossible without a legal system that works, that prevents
society from dissolving into a Hobbesian state of nature, like
that which has prevailed in Beirut for the last fifteen years, in
which the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short."21
Thus, Friedman concludes, ordinary people are not
libertarians, who would advocate minimal state regulation, but
they are individualists.' They accept rules that regulate access
to such scarce resources as television channels, radio
frequencies, wilderness areas, fur-bearing animals, and the
highways; for without such rules meaningful choice would
become impossible. Highway traffic without regulation leads
to chaos and destruction.' But on the other hand, another
kind of rule that has developed only recently is designed to
enhance the choices available to individuals, not by restricting
or regulating access to scarce goods or facilities, but by
demanding that each individual be judged on his or her own
merits and not because of membership in some group." The
civil rights movement, designed to open educational and
19. Id at 46.
20. Id.
21. THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN, bk. 1, ch. 13.
22. CHOICE, supra note 1, at 62.
23. Id. at 62-63.
24. Id. at 63.
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employment opportunities to black citizens, was followed by
the women's movement, and then by gays and lesbians, "the
handicapped, the elderly, prisoners, students, immigrants, and
others."'  Each of them has emphasized individualism and
individual autonomy. The principle is that individuals should
be able to determine their own destiny without hindrance by
laws based upon membership in classes.
Still another set of laws and regulations governs
economic relationships, imposing restraints upon employers,
landlords, banks, railroads, and other businesses that are
designed to confer greater power and more decision-making
ability upon small businesses, farmers, shopkeepers, and
consumers.' The entire panoply of entitlements conferred
upon the individual by the welfare state, including the so-
called safety nets of social security, food stamps, and other
forms of social insurance, are designed, according to Friedman,
to ensure against any diminution in the individual's choices
when such necessities as food and shelter are at risk. 7
Contrary to the contention of some conservatives and all
libertarians, Friedman says, some laws actually increase the
scope of individual liberty.' Because we are so dependent
upon strangers in modern society, we must rely on regulatory
control, as exemplified by the requirements that food
packagers list the ingredients on their packages and that
airline pilots have licenses. Such control enhances the range
of choices that we may enjoy.2
In recent years, American law has established a kind of
principle against discriminating against people because of
"immutable" characteristics.' Some characteristics are
immutable because of biology. Others are seen to be
25. Id.
26. Id at 65.
27. Id. at 67.
28. Id. at 68-69.
29. Id. at 72-73.
30. Id. at 89.
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immutable as a result of social or cultural conditioning. But
most are in fact hybrids of biology and definitions based upon
social codes. Thus, for example, race is generally thought to
be a purely biological question, but in fact, a person's race is
determined by social or legal codes: whether a person with
a single black grandparent is caucasian or black is a
normative, and not a scientific question." Moreover, what is
"immutable" at one time may not be so at another. A
person's religion, for example, was fixed at birth in the
nineteenth century, but today, at least in the United States, it
is changeable at will. The courts have at times suggested that
discrimination based upon race, gender, religion, or national
origin is wrong because people cannot help but belong to the
particular groups they were born into. But in the United
States, at least, it is clear that many of these characteristics
are alterable virtually at will.32
The courts have gone so far as to say that people
should not be disadvantaged, in some areas, by the fact that
they are less wealthy than others. In Gideon v. Wainright,33
the Court held that an indigent criminal defendant was
entitled to legal representation at the state's expense, and in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,34 the Court held that
citizens who were too poor to pay the poll tax could not be
deprived of the right to vote. But unlike other forms of
"discrimination," wealth discrimination has not led to the
assumption of strict scrutiny as a test in contested cases.
Friedman speculates that this may be so because the public
continues to view wealth as the product of merit, and its
privileges as having been earned or deserved, while the
privileges accorded to persons of preferred races, religious
groups, and sexual groups are seen as being undeserved,
31. Id. at 90.
32. Id. at 92-93.
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34. 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
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unearned, and consequently, unjust.'
Friedman concludes that in the Republic of Choice,
"[p]eople should not suffer harm because of events, traits, and
conditions over which they have no real control."' Injustice,
he argues, pertains whenever suffering follows as a
consequence of a calamity or misfortune that "is not the result
of free choice and is 'undeserved.' 37
Although it is easy to see that in the context of the cases
he has been discussing (misfortunes that result from racism,
sexism, and the like), he is probably on the right track, as a
proposition of general applicability, his principle seems to be
clearly wrong. A person who is the victim of an accident
brought about purely by natural forces, such as a landslide, an
earthquake, a flood, or a lightning strike, over which no one
has any control has suffered a misfortune that is not the result
of free choice. Whether the injury sustained is "undeserved"
depends upon how one thinks of that term. As a kind of
emotional utterance declaring that the innocent victim's
suffering is tragic, unfortunate, and not to be explained by any
fault of her own, it is unexceptionable. But if the statement,
"Theresa did not deserve to lose her leg in that landslide," is
taken to mean that the victim suffered some wrong unjustly
inflicted upon her, it makes no political, moral, or legal sense.
Consider the following case:
A physician, Dr. Hacker, mistook Bromley for Horn,
another patient whose right leg was to be amputated because
of an advanced case of gangrene, and amputated Bromley's
leg instead of treating a small boil that had developed on
Bromley's big toe. The medical malpractice suit brought by
Bromley against Hacker resulted in a verdict for Hacker. A
friend, learning of the verdict, said, "Bromley didn't deserve to
lose his leg in that operation." This can reasonably be
construed to mean, not only that the friend is distressed over
35. CHOICE, supra note 1, at 93-94.




Bromley's lost leg, but also that Hacker's behavior was wrong
and the jury's verdict unjust. The friend might also intend to
convey her judgment that someone other than Bromley should
pay for the damage he sustained. In short, it makes sense to
claim that Hacker, the hospital, or society owes something to
Bromley for the loss he sustained. It makes no sense at all to
claim that anyone owes Theresa anything for the loss of her
leg. There is simply no one to blame in Theresa's case, and
even though she didn't deserve to suffer her injury, in the
sense that her injury is a very sad bit of ill fortune, it does not
follow that anyone, including society at large, owes her
anything more than sympathy and, if she needs it, perhaps
some assistance by way of charity. Theresa's bad luck should
not necessarily become everyone else's bad luck as well by
imposing upon them the duty to provide for her care and
maintenance. 8  In short, Friedman is simply wrong in his
contention that "when bad things happen to us that are not
our choice and cannot be laid at our door, it is necessary for
some outside agency to 'take responsibility'. . . ."I' There is
no rule of justice or morality that demands that there be a
remedy for every hurt, or even for every wrong.
This brings us to another central contention that
Friedman makes:
In classical legal theory, the concept of "right"
was always balanced by the concept of duty; one
man's right was another man's duty; in theory,
then, the creation of rights always implied the
creation of fresh duties.' But "rights" and
"duties" in actual legal systems are asymmetrically
distributed; the trend, in modern law, is to
38. The author assumes that she has not had the foresight to provide for her own care
by purchasing medical insurance or saving enough to sustain herself through the coming years.
39. CHOICE, supra note 1, at 193 (emphasis in original text).
40. Id. (citing Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913); STONE, LEGAL SYsTEM AND LAWYER'S REASONINGS, 137-
61 (1964)). See id. at 237 n.10.
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impose duties on government and large
institutions. The bearers of rights are
individuals. 1
In Hohfeld's analysis of legal rights, there are four kinds
of rights." Not all of them imply correlative duties. In each
of them, however, the government stands as an outside third
party, as a kind of enforcer of the rights discussed. Thus, if
the client of a securities firm orders a hundred shares of stock
from his broker, the client has a right to have the securities
delivered to him if they are in fact purchased, and the firm
has a correlative duty to deliver those securities to the client.
At the same time, the firm has a right to be paid for the
securities it has purchased on the client's behalf and the client
has a correlative duty to pay that sum to the firm. The
government stands outside the transaction unless a problem
arises. If a problem does arise, and either the client or the
firm complains through the appropriate governmental
channels, the government steps in to enforce the claim of the
wronged party. But the government is not a party to the
agreement, and has no duty with respect to either of the
parties except to do what government is thought, by virtually
all legal philosophers and ordinary citizens, to be designed to
do: to keep the peace by enforcing the legal rights of its
citizens.
Friedman concludes that "[c]hoice and responsibility do
not balance each other off logically or legally, as right and
duty did in legal theory . . . ." and that they do not "stand
in balance" in the real world.' Here too, it appears that he
may have overstated his case.
Before Congress and the courts ruled on the right of
black citizens to be served in restaurants and other places of
public accommodation, Lester Maddox had the right (legally)
41. CHOICES, supra note 1, at 193 (emphasis in original text).




to demand that black citizens refrain from entering his Pick-
a-Rick Restaurant and to give his white customers axe handles
to use on any black person who trespassed on his property.
Maddox's right to choose whether to admit blacks as
customers entailed a corresponding duty on the part of all
black persons to refrain from intruding onto Maddox's
property. Once the law changed, the locus of the choice
shifted from Maddox to black citizens. Black citizens then had
the choice to enter or refrain from entering the Pick-a-Rick,
and Maddox and his white customers had a corresponding
duty to refrain from interfering with their exercise of that
choice. That "choice" is precisely what Hohfeld called a
demand-right, with its corresponding duty."
For every person who has a "choice", i.e., the option of
doing or refraining from doing x, y, or z, there is at least one
other person, and usually there are many persons, who have
the duty not to interfere with that individual's choice, even
though they may be affected by the choice thus made. To use
some of Friedman's examples:
(1) A young woman today has a wide range of choices
in the area of sexual conduct. As Friedman aptly puts it,
members of the middle class "[a]im to go through life like
shoppers in some cosmic department store, pushing a gigantic
shopping cart, picking items at will off the endless shelves."'4
Among other things, "the supermarket is also a sex shop."'
Corresponding to the young woman's right to choose are
duties that did not exist before, and could not even have been
imagined as existing: the duty of her parents, for example,
not to interfere with her sexual choices, of her school not to
suspend or expel her because of her sexual activities, of her
employer not to intrude into her private sexual conduct, and
so on.
44. Id
45. CHOCES, supra note 1, at 192.
46. As well as "a shopping center for religions, a fashion emporium, and a career fair
..... " Id. at 192-93.
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(2) A young man's choice of religious practices in the
cosmic supermarket is practically unlimited. Whereas at one
time it was not at all uncommon for proselytizing activities to
be strictly limited, today there is practically no limitation at all.
The young man's decision to join the Moonies or the Hare
Krishnas corresponds to his parents' duty not to have him
kidnapped for deprogramming, and the airport authority's duty
not to interfere with his chanting and soliciting money for his
cause, even though it causes some distress and discomfort for
some passengers. It also imposes upon persons using the
airport for its designated purpose a kind of liability that they
might not have counted on when they purchased their airline
tickets: the necessity of having to listen to the chants and
being importuned for contributions as they pass through the
airport, however offensive that might be to them.
(3) Billie Boggs's right to choose to reside on a
cardboard carton situated on a sidewalk adjacent to a business
establishment and apartment house47 imposes numerous
liabilities upon the residents, businesses, and passersby of that
neighborhood. They must be subjected to her screams and
curses and her demands for money. The businesses may have
to suffer lost sales and lower profits because of her presence
in the vicinity. Their sensibilities may be grossly offended by
the smell of her excrement and her clothing. And despite all
of this, her legally protected right to remain there imposes
upon each of them the duty not to remove her or otherwise
interfere with her decision to remain there.
Friedman concludes that "modern society defines justice
as the fulfillment of expectations . . . ."' This may be so, but
for every person whose expectations are fulfilled in the
republic of choice, there are others whose expectations are of
necessity frustrated and disappointed. Whether we approve
of the current state of affairs or not, it is simply a fact that
when children's choices are legally protected, their parents'
47. See supra note 4.
48. CHOICES, supra note 1, at 194.
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expectation that they will be able to exercise what they
believed were proper parental prerogatives must be
disappointed. Fulfillment of the voyeur's desire to be titillated
by pornographic films frustrates the expectations of those
members of the community who prefer to have a "clean"
neighborhood and to keep such spectacles out of the reach of
their children and their fellow citizens. And fulfillment of
Billie Boggs's expectations plainly disappoints those of her
neighbors.
The republic of choice, then, is not a utopia in which
everyone's expectations will be fulfilled. Nor is it obvious that
the range of choices available is any greater than it was
before, say, in the Victorian era. For every choice that has
recently become available in the cosmic supermarket, some
other one has been removed from the shelves. Friedman has
done a masterful job of describing the magnificent array of
choices now set forth in this great emporium. But it would be
a serious mistake to suppose that all of the customers will find
what they are looking for. It remains to be seen whether the
pressure exercised by some of the more vocal customers has
resulted in a better selection, or just a different one. Some of
the older customers have become more and more vocal as
their anger over the loss of their old favorites has intensified.
The manager of the store might be well advised not to listen
to Friedman's siren call, not to succumb to his sales pitch for
the new merchandise, and to consider carefully whether there
might still be some value in the old.
1990] 327
